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Abstract—With the increasing development of advanced com-
munication technologies, vehicles are becoming smarter and more
connected. Due to the tremendous growth of various vehicu-
lar applications, a huge amount of data is generated through
advanced on-board devices and is deemed critical to improve
driving safety and enhance vehicular services. However, cloud
based models often fall short in applications where latency and
mobility are critical. In order to fully realize the potential of
vehicular networks, the challenges of efficient communication and
computation need to be addressed. In this direction, vehicular
fog computing (VFC) has emerged which extends the concept
of fog computing to conventional vehicular networks. It is a geo-
graphically distributed paradigm that has the potential to conduct
time-critical and data-intensive tasks by pushing intelligence (i.e.
computing resources, storage, and application services) in the
vicinity of end vehicles. However secure and reliable transmission
are of significant importance in highly-mobile vehicular networks
in order to ensure the optimal Quality of Service (QoS). In this
direction, several authentication mechanisms have been proposed
in the literature but most of them are found unfit due to absence
of decentralization, anonymity, and trust characteristics. Thus,
an effective cross-datacenter authentication and key-exchange
scheme based on blockchain and elliptic curve cryptography
(ECC) is proposed in this paper. Here, the distributed ledger of
blockchain is used for maintaining the network information while
the highly secure ECC is employed for mutual authentication
between vehicles and road side units (RSUs). Additionally, the
proposed scheme is lightweight and scalable for the considered
VFC setup. The performance evaluation results against the exist-
ing state-of-the-art reveal that the proposed scheme accomplishes
enhanced security features with reduced computational and
communicational overheads. Further, its extensive evaluation on
the widely applicable Automated Validation of Internet Security
Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) tool guarantee its safeness
against different attack vectors.
Index Terms—Authentication protocol, Blockchain, Elliptic
curve cryptography, Key exchange, and Vehicular fog computing
I. INTRODUCTION
With the emergence of information and communication
technology, vehicles have become smarter than ever before.
The integration of sensing, communication, and networking
abilities in vehicles have enabled them to smartly interact
with each other and with road-side units (RSU) in order
to share information on a real-time basis. This information
exchange capability of vehicles has led to the emergence
of Vehicular adhoc Networks (VANETs), a key part of the
intelligent transportation systems (ITS). These urban vehicular
networks ensure a wide range of vehicle-based services for
their intended users like road safety applications, smart traffic
control, entertainment services, etc [1]. Nevertheless, with
the penetration of millions of smart vehicles in the global
market, a gigantic bunch of vehicular on-board facilities have
been furnished which collect and exchange huge amounts of
data, resulting in significant growth of the network traffic
[2]. Although the conventional cloud computing architecture
is known for providing a diverse range of services to vehicular
networks, the long network distance between mobile devices
and remote data centers hinders its performance while resulting
in a high delay sensitivity [3]. Thus, the concept of vehicular
fog computing (VFC) has evolved, in which computation, stor-
age, and networking are hosted in close proximity to vehicles
[4], [5]. The extension of the fog computing paradigm to
conventional vehicular networks brings multiple opportunities
to collect, process, organize, and store traffic data in real time.
Locating the services close to end devices achieves better
communication efficiency, seamless data processing, location
awareness, and real-time response while minimizing latency
along with other constraints. However, in order to ensure the
desirable quality of service (QoS), an optimal balance between
performance, security, and privacy requirements has become
prominent [6], [7].
In this direction, several authentication protocols have been
proposed for vehicular fog infrastructures. For example, Kang
et al. [8] proposed a privacy-preserved pseudonym scheme to
address the location privacy issues in VFC. Likewise, Yao
et al. [9] presented a three-layered framework to ensure the
reliability and security of VFC while preserving its perfor-
mance. Considering the importance of vehicular crowdsensing
in transportation, Wei et al. [10] proposed a fog-based privacy-
preserving scheme for conditional road surface monitoring. In
a similar direction, Basudan et al. [11] also devised a privacy-
preserving protocol to enhance the security of the vehicular
crowdsensing network. To provide secure data transmission
in VFC, Wang et al. [12] proposed a reliable and privacy-
preserving task recomposition based on Paillier encryption. In
[13], Kong et al. also used homomorphic Paillier cryptosystem
to design a secure querying scheme for data dissemination in
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VFC. Likewise, a new privacy-preserving route-sharing scheme
for VFC was devised in [14] to protect user and group privacy.
Although several authentication schemes exists in the literature,
most of them fail to provide data auditability, in case the central
server crashes. Moreover, the existing approaches also incurs
high computational cost and communication overhead due to
large number of interactions among users and data centers [15].
In order to provide information confidentiality, mutual au-
thenticity, privacy, and anonymity, records should be kept
in a distributed manner. Thus, blockchain has emerged as a
feasible solution to achieve such goals. A blockchain is a
decentralized and distributed ledger in which a digital record
of transactions is maintained across blocks without requiring
a central authority. All the blocks in the blockchain are linked
in a chronological order to form a chain and secured using
cryptography. Since, central managers are not involved in the
blockchain structure, it is more robust against single point
failure issues. Due to its wide range of benefits, blockchain-
based applications, ranging from financial services to Internet
of Things (IoT), are constantly expanding. Motivated by these
facts, several approaches were developed in the literature in
order to provide authentication in vehicular networks. For
example, Lei et al. [16] put forward a novel network topol-
ogy based on a decentralized blockchain structure; wherein
a blockchain was employed to simplify the distributed key
management in vehicular communication systems. Kang et
al. [17] adopted the concept of consortium blockchain to
achieve secure data storage and sharing in vehicular edge
networks. To support conditional privacy, one-to-many match-
ing, destination matching, and data auditability in VFC, Li
et al. [18] proposed an efficient and privacy preserving car-
pooling scheme using blockchain. Accordingly, Yao et al. [19]
presented a lightweight anonymous authentication mechanism
for distributed vehicular fog services using blockchain. Their
primary focus was on cross-data center authentication using
blockchain and cryptographic functions. However, the designed
scheme did not support mutual authentication between vehicles
and service managers (SMs), which is a prerequisite for any
secure authentication protocol.
A. Contributions
It is evident from the above discussion that a number of
approaches have been proposed for VFC infrastructures but
limited works have been carried out with respect to cross-
data center authentication for accessing VFS, which is deemed
important for providing any service in VFC scenarios. Keeping
in view the necessity of accessing the VFS with reduced
latency and overhead while maintaining an adequate level of
security, it is essential to design a cross-datacenter authenti-
cation and key-exchange mechanism that is not only secure
but also lightweight. Additionally, the literature also suggest
that the existing approaches are primarily focused on central-
ized architectures which fall short in maintaining the network
information across a distributed setup such as vehicular fogs
in a profitable manner. Thus, the major contributions of the
proposed work can be summarized as follows:
• We present an effective cross-datacenter authentication
and key-exchange scheme using blockchain and Elliptic
curve cryptography (ECC). Here, the distributed ledger of
blockchain is used for maintaining the network informa-
tion while the highly secure ECC is employed for mutual
authentication between vehicles and RSUs.
• The proposed scheme has been purposefully designed
to be lightweight while provisioning the facility of re-
authentication to participating vehicles.
• The design goals of the proposed lightweight mechanism
include cross-data center authentication, user anonymity,
mutual authentication, user privacy and confidentiality.
• Lastly, the proposed scheme has been extensively evalu-
ated with the existing state-of-the-art in terms of security
features and computational and communicational over-
heads. Additionally, the safeness of the designed authen-
tication and key-exchange mechanism has been validated
using the well-known AVISPA tool.
B. Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
illustrates the system model of the proposed work followed by
the proposed authentication mechanism in Section III. More-
over, detailed analysis of the security features and performance
analysis are illustrated in Section IV. Finally, the conclusions
are summarized in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A high level diagram considered in the proposed work is
depicted in Fig. 1 and is inspired from the work carried out
in [9], [19]. As shown in the figure, the considered vehicular
fog computing environment primarily consists of the following
entities which actively participate in provisioning the designed
authentication and key exchange solution in the considered
VFC setup based on blockchain and ECC.
• Region: The considered VFC setup can be segregated
into different regions comprised of different vehicular fog
data-centers (VFDs) responsible of provisioning VFS to the
intended users. Further each region may encapsulate one or
many RSUs and a single service manager (SM) and witness
peer (WP).
• Road Side Unit: In VANETs, RSUs are the communicating
nodes which provide different safety and entertainment services
to vehicles and further relay the required information amongst
each other. In the considered VFC scenario, a RSU manages
a VFD and provides VFSs to the legitimate users.
• On-board Unit (OBU): These are mounted on the vehicles
and help them to interact with each other (V2V) and with
RSUs (V2I). They are powered with communicational, compu-
tational, and storage facilities. In the current context, OBUs are
referred to VFS end-users which are required to be registered
with the audit department (AD) to access the intended services.
• Audit Department: Here, the AD is a central trusted author-
ity which is responsible of publishing the public parameters to
Fig. 1: A typical vehicular fog computing scenario [19].
employed cryptographic functions. Additionally, it is also a
place of registration for the vehicles/OBUs and the SMs.
• Service Manager: The SM is essentially responsible for
managing the blockchain network of a particular region. It is
an authorized entity registered with the AD, which helps OBUs
to authenticate and establish trust with the VFC infrastructure.
• Witness Peer: Every SM is associated with a witness
peer (WP) that helps writing the authentication results to
the public ledger. WP together with SM forms a consortium
blockchain network and rely on Practical Byzantine Fault
Tolerance (PBFT) for consensus establishment.
III. CROSS DATA CENTER AUTHENTICATION IN VFC
The overall process of key exchange and authentication in
the considered VFC environment can be segregated into the
following five phases: 1) System Initialization Phase, 2) Reg-
istration Phase, 3) Mutual Authentication and Key Exchange
Phase, 4) Consensus Phase, and 5) Service-Delivery Phase. The
detailed description of these phases is presented below:
A. Phase I: System Initialization Phase
During this phase, the AD prepares the VFC environment
for the upcoming phases of the proposed scheme. The detailed
elaboration of this phase is as follows:
Step 1: The AD picks an elliptic curve E with the public
parameters P and n. Here, the parameters refer to the base
point of E and a large prime number, respectively.
Step 2: The AD deduces its public and private key as (SKAD
& PKAD), where SKAD ∈ Z∗p and PKAD = SKAD.P . Here,
the operation (.) denotes the ECC multiplicative operation.
Step 3: Finally, the AD declares the collision-resistant one-
way hash functions (H1() and H2()) to be used during the
authentication and key exchange mechanism. With this, the
parameters < E, p, n,H1(), H2(),PKAD > are made public,
i.e., are published.
B. Phase II: Registration Phase
During this phase, the OBUs and SMs register themselves
with the AD over a secure channel. In order to maintain
the OBUs’ and SMs’ anonymity, their respective identities
OBU i AD
-Selects TDOBUi
-Generates time stamp TOBUi
-Computes TK0 = {TDOBUi ||TOBUi}
-Computes EPKAD (TK0)
<EPKAD (TK0), TOBUi>−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
-Decrypts EPKAD (TK0)
-Extracts TDOBUi and TOBUi from TK0
-Validates TOBUi
-Check the availability of TDOBUi in
its blockchain
-Allocate unique Id TDOBUi to OBU
-Generates a random secret key (SKOBUi )
-Computes its public key PKOBUi using
SKOBUi .P
-Computes TK1 =< PKOBUi , SKOBUi >
-Stores l = H1(SKOBUi ||TDOBUi )⊕
H2(SKAD||TDOBUi )
<TK1,H2(SKAD||TDOBUi )> over secure channel←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
-Saves PKOBUi , SKOBUi , & m = H2(SKAD||TDOBUi )
Fig. 2: Phase II: Registration Phase.
(TDOBUi and TDSMj ) are never relayed in clear text as
illustrated in Fig. 2.
Step 1: The OBU i selects an identity TDOBUi for itself and
simultaneously generates a time stamp TOBUi . This time stamp
helps in validating the relayed message and ensures that the
messages are not relayed in the near future.
Step 2: The OBU then computes an intermediate token TK0 =
{TDOBUi ||TOBUi}, followed by its encryption using the AD’s
public key PKAD. The computed token TK0 value is then
relayed to AD.
Step 3: Upon receiving, TK0, the AD then decrypts the mes-
sage to extract the values of TDOBUi and TOBUi . Following
this, AD validates the time-stamp of the generated token. If
TOBUi falls within the permissible time window, then AD pro-
ceeds, else the connection is terminated. In the next phase, the
AD validates the availability of TDOBUi in its blockchain. If a
match is found, the ith OBU is directed to generate a new iden-
tity for itself and the above process is repeated. Afterwards, the
AD generates the private-public key pairs (PKOBUi ,SKOBUi )
for the OBU and transmits the same over the secured channel.
Additionally, the AD also computes, transmits, and stores the
value of l = H1(SKOBUi ||TDOBUi) ⊕H2(SKAD||TDOBUi)
in its distributed ledger.
Step 4: The ith OBU then stores the values of l and SKOBUi
in its repository.
C. Phase III: Mutual Authentication and Key Exchange Phase
During this phase, the OBUs mutually authenticate with
the SMs via the deployed RSU and share a session key for
further connection. The entire process is detailed in Fig. 3 and
discussed as follows.
Step 1: The ith OBU initially generates a random number r1
and time stamp TOBUi . Following this, it performs two ECC
multiplicative operations over r1 to compute R1 and R2.
Step 2: Next, the OBU computes the values of the token
TKOBUi = H1(SKOBUi ||TDOBUi) ⊕ m; which involves a
H1(.), concatenation and XOR operations. Using this token,
OBU i SM j
-Select a random number r1 ∈ Z∗p
-Generate time stamp TOBUi
-Compute R1 = r1.P
-Compute R2 = SKOBUi .R1
-Compute TKOBUi = H1(SKOBUi ||TDOBUi )⊕m
-Compute AuthOBUi = H1(R2||TDOBUi ||TOBUi ||TKOBUi )
<AuthOBUi , r1, TOBUi , TDOBUi>−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
-Validate time stamp TOBUi
-Fetch l for the TDOBUi
-Compute Auth∗OBUi =
H1(r1.PKOBUi ||TDOBUi ||TOBUi ||l)
-Check Auth∗OBUi
?
= AuthOBUi
-If same, OBU is marked authentic; else tear down the
connection
-Select a random number r2 ∈ Z∗p
-Compute R3 = r2.P
-Compute R4 = SKSMj .R3
-Generate time stamp TSMj
-Compute AuthSMj = H1(R4||TSMj ||l)
-Compute SKij = kdf(TDOBUi ||l||TOBUi ||TSMj )
<TSMj
, r2, AuthSMj>←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
-Validate time stamp TSMj
-Auth∗SMj = H1(r2.SKSMj ||TSMj ||TKOBUi )
-Check Auth∗SMj
?
= AuthSMj
-If same, SM is marked authentic; else connection terminated
-Compute SKij = kdf(TDOBUi ||TKOBUi ||TOBUi ||TSMj )
Fig. 3: Phase III: Mutual Authentication and Key Exchange
Phase.
the value of OBU’s authentication token is estimated as
follows: AuthOBUi = H1(R2||TDOBUi ||TOBUi ||TKOBUi).
Finally, the values of < AuthOBUi , r1, TOBUi , TDOBUi >
are relayed to the jth SM via its RSU for further analysis.
Step 3: Upon receiving these values, the first step performed by
SMj is validation of the time-stamp TOBUi . Upon successful
validation, the SM fetches the value of l from the registered list
of OBU’s blockchain. Using this value, SM calculates an au-
thentication token to validate the truthfulness of AuthOBUi as
follows: Auth∗OBUi = H1(r1.PKOBUi ||TDOBUi ||TOBUi ||l).
If the values of AuthOBUi and Auth∗OBUi match, then SM
successfully establishes the authenticity of the ith OBU, else
the connection is terminated.
Step 4: Next, SMj generates a random number, a time
stamp (TSMj ), and an authentication token (Auth∗SMj =
H1(r2.SKSMj ||TSMj ||TKOBUi)) in the same manner as
OBUi. Additionally, it computes a session key, using
key derivation function (kdf), to be used for further
communication between the two parties as: SKij =
kdf(TDOBUi ||l||TOBUi ||TSMj ). Finally, the values of <
TSMj , r2, AuthSMj > are transmitted to the ith OBU for
further processing.
Step 5: On receiving the values of < TSMj , r2, AuthSMj >,
the OBU proceeds further only if the received time-stamp is
found valid.
Step 6: Next, the OBU validates the authenticity of the
SM by performing the following computations: Auth∗SMj =
H1(r2.SKSMj ||TSMj ||TKOBUi). The successful validation of
Auth∗SMj and AuthSMj establishes the authenticity of the j
th
SM; this implies that both parties have successfully validated
each other and are ready for further data transmission.
Step 7: Finally, OBUi computes the session key SKij =
kdf(TDOBUi ||TKOBUi ||TOBUi ||TSMj ).
D. Phase IV: Consensus Phase
In the proposed scheme, we consider a PFBFT consensus
algorithm for forming the public ledger. The authentication
results are transferred to the blockchain using the following
steps.
Step 1: In the considered setup, we assume n WPs with the
ability to write a block to the public ledger. During the process
of consensus, one of the WPs is marked as the “Speaker”;
while the rest act as “Congressmen”. The selected speaker is
responsible for holding the consensus mechanism and cannot
participate in the voting mechanism. However, the speaker is
expected to conduct m rounds of consensus for saving the time
involved in speaker selection. Here, the speaker x is selected
using the following evaluation: x = (h mod n) + 1 where h
refers to the current block’s height.
Step 2: Post successful authentication and key exchange (as
detailed in previous phase), the jth SM broadcasts the authen-
tication results to all the WPs.
Step 3: Upon receiving the broadcast authentication results, the
WPs store the results in their respective memories; before they
can be transferred to the public ledger.
Step 4: After t intervals, the blockchain containing the
authentication results is created, which in then followed
by the voting process. In the initial run, the speaker
broadcasts a request to the congressmen to vote using <
Preq, h,WPx, block, SigWPx(block) >. Here, the variable
Preq denotes speaker’s request others to vote.
Step 5: Post receiving the request, the kth WP share its vote
using < Pres, h,WPk, block, SigWPk(block) > wherein Pres
denotes kth WP’s response.
Step 6: Upon receiving the response from the WPs, the speaker
reaches a consensus to publish the block to the public ledger.
E. Phase V: Service Delivery Phase
This particular phase provides OBU the facility to avail
the VFS seamlessly without the need to re-authenticate when
moving to a new region. Under such a scenario, the ith
OBU sends an encrypted token EPKSMj∗ (l) where l =
H1(SKOBUi ||TDOBUi) ⊕ H2(SKAD||TDOBUi). Once the
new SM, j∗, receives the request via the new RSU, then it
decrypts the token to deduce l, and validates the existence
of this token in its local database. If not found, it cross-
checks the same in the public ledger. A match denotes that
the authentication has been carried out sometime in the past.
SM then checks the revocation list, if l is not found then it is
established that the ith OBU is valid and shall be seamlessly
provided VFS without the need for re-authentication.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This section presents the performance evaluation of the
proposed scheme against the current state-of-the-art. For the
detailed performance evaluation, the comparison has been
performed in terms of (1) security features (2) formal security
verification using AVISPA and (3) computational and commu-
nicational overheads analysis. The corresponding details are
mentioned as follows:
A. Security feature evaluation
The design goals of the proposed scheme have been high-
lighted in Section I-A. In accordance with these features,
the relative comparison with an existing scheme based on
blockchain has been detailed in Table I. It is evident from
the comparison that the proposed scheme provisions higher
number of security features. For instance, the proposed scheme
provides mutual authentication between OBUs and SMs, en-
ables key exchange functionality, resists replay attacks, and
supports forward secrecy.
TABLE I: Comparison of the security features provided by
proposed scheme against the existing state-of-the-art [19].
Scheme [19] Proposed
Supports Mutual Authentication × X
Supports Anonymity X X
Resists Replay × X
Resists Impersonation X X
Supports Forward Secrecy × X
Supports Confidentiality X X
Supports Integrity X X
Supports Non-interactivity X X
Supports Non-repudiation X X
Supports Key Exchange × X
B. Formal security verification
In addition to the above validation, the execution of the
proposed scheme was also formally verified using a well known
tool-AVISPA. It is an open source suite of applications that
is supportive in analyzing and verifying security protocols.
In order to validate any designed security protocol, AVISPA
needs the input in high level protocol specification language
(HLPSL). The structure of HLPSL helps to describe the
security protocol with intended security features and goals. The
HLPSL defines the protocol in terms of different functions such
as roles, transitions, composed role, and a top-level role named
environment. Further, AVISPA relies on the support of four
different back-ends to validate any designed security protocol.
These backends are namely-on the fly model checker (OFMC),
CL-based attack searcher (CL-AtSe), SAT-based model checker
(SATMC), and tree automata-based protocol analyzer (TA4SP).
The back-ends help validate the safeness of the proposed
mechanism against the targeted security goals and provide the
user with a detailed trace in case of violation.
In order to validate the proposed scheme, Phase III of the
scheme has been coded in HLPSL and subjected to AVISPA to
verify its safeness against different security attacks. The related
results, depicted in Fig. 4, clearly show that the proposed
authentication mechanism is safe on OFMC and CL-AtSe
back-ends.
C. Computational and Communicational Overhead Analysis
In this section, the detailed analysis of the proposed scheme
relative to an existing scheme [19] has been carried out in terms
% OFMC
% Version of 2006/02/13
SUMMARY
SAFE
DETAILS
BOUNDED NUMBER
OF SESSIONS
PROTOCOL
/home/span/BlockECC.if
GOAL
as specified
BACKEND
OFMC
COMMENTS
STATISTICS
parseTime: 0.00s
searchTime: 0.23s
visitedNodes: 27 nodes
depth: 4 plies
SUMMARY
SAFE
DETAILS
BOUNDED NUMBER
hspace*2mm OF SESSIONS
TYPED MODEL
PROTOCOL
/home/span/BlockECC.if
GOAL
As Specified
BACKEND
CL-AtSe
STATISTICS
Analysed : 0 states
Reachable : 0 states
Translation: 0.13 seconds
Computation: 0.00 seconds
Fig. 4: Evaluation of mutual authentication and key exchange
mechanism on AVISPA
of computational and communicational overheads analysis.
These results have been validated typically for Phase III
since the majority of the computational and communicational
overhead differences have been observed for this phase. In
order to assess their performance, the experimental results
derived by Yao et al. in [19] have been employed. The authors
summarized the computational time required in executing the
cryptographic hash function (Th) and ECC-based multiplicative
operation (TECC) in their work as 0.596 msec and 1.473 msec,
respectively. The computational time with respect to XOR and
concatenation is assumed to be negligible. Further, the time
for executing kdf operations has not been evaluated since it is
used for session key generation that is performed only in the
proposed scheme.
In total, the proposed scheme executes a total of 5 hash
functions and 6 ECC-based multiplicative operations, against
a total of 5 and (k+3) operations respectively by the existing
scheme. Thus, the total computational overhead associated
with single pass of Phase III is 5 × Th + 6 × TECC (in the
proposed scheme) and 5 × Th + (k + 3) × TECC (in the
existing scheme). On the basis of this observation, Fig. 5a
and 5b summarize the results with respect of variable number
of vehicles and SMs. It is evident from Fig. 5a that the
computational overhead increases when increasing the number
of vehicles which can be attributed to the increasing number of
authentication requests. However, the results clearly showcase
that the proposed scheme depicts superior results compared
to the existing scheme. Additionally, the results obtained in
Fig. 5b clearly show that the proposed scheme is scalable and
is not affected by the increase in the number of SMs. On the
other hand, the computational overhead of the existing scheme
rises significantly when increasing the number of SMs.
Apart from the above comparison, Figs. 5c and 5d highlight
the communicational overhead associated with the two schemes
for a variable number of vehicles and SMs respectively. The
comparison is based upon the number of token transmit-
ted between the OBUs and SMs during the authentication
process. For the proposed scheme, the following tokens <
AuthOBUi , r1, TOBUi , TDOBUi , TSMj , r2, AuthSMj >
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Fig. 5: An illustration of computational and communicational overhead analysis.
were communicated between the two parties which results to
a total of 7 tokens. Meanwhile, a total of k + 2 tokens were
sent in the existing scheme. It is evident from the results that,
for the scenarios, the existing scheme experiences constant
increase in the communicational overhead compared to the
proposed scheme. It is worth noticing that the proposed scheme
is unaffected by the number of SMs and and experiences less
overhead even with increase in number of vehicles. Thus, it
can be concluded that the proposed scheme is lightweight
compared to the existing scheme.
V. CONCLUSION
VFC has emerged as a promising candidate for the provi-
sioning of different services including safety and infotainment
in modern ITS. However, its growing popularity is accom-
panied with a gigantic array of security attacks. Thus, it is
essential to safeguard these networks against different attack
vectors. In this direction, provably secure authentication and
key exchange policies are essential. Therefore, in this paper,
a lightweight authentication and key exchange mechanism
for VFC infrastructures has been proposed. The designed
mechanism is based on ECC and blockchain; which helps
vehicles to seamlessly access VFS with the following features:
cross-data center authentication, user anonymity, mutual au-
thentication, lightweight, user privacy and confidentiality. The
extensive performance assessment of the proposed mechanism
established its superiority in terms of reduced communicational
and computational overheads with enhanced security features
relative to an existing scheme.
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